Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

6-14-2018

Are the stock markets "rigged"? An empirical
analysis of regulatory change
Stephen Diamond
Santa Clara University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Diamond, S.F., Kuan, J.W., 2018. Are the stock markets “rigged”? An empirical analysis of regulatory change. International Review of
Law and Economics 55, 33–40. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2018.03.002

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com, pamjadi@scu.edu.

International Review of Law and Economics 55 (2018) 33–40

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

International Review of Law and Economics

Are the stock markets “rigged”? An empirical analysis of regulatory
change夽
Stephen F. Diamond a,∗ , Jennifer W. Kuan b
a
b

Santa Clara University, United States
Tulane University, United States

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history:
Received 21 February 2018
Accepted 16 March 2018
Available online 22 March 2018
Keywords:
Stock market
High frequency trading
Flash crashes
Non-proﬁt
SEC

a b s t r a c t
Volatile events in the stock market such as the 2010 Flash Crash have sparked concern that ﬁnancial
markets are “rigged” in favor of trading ﬁrms that use high frequency trading (“HFT”) systems. We analyze
a regulatory change implemented by the SEC in 2007 by examining its effect on a key market metric, the
bid-ask spread, an investor cost, and ﬁnd that the regulatory shift, indeed, disadvantages investors. We
link the implementation of this change to a shift in the volume of trades from a low-cost venue to a highcost venue. We argue that this outcome is predicted by the incentives of the venues, non-proﬁt stock
exchanges owned by different types of members. The less-volatile, lower-cost New York Stock Exchange
was owned by underwriters and included a specialist system that is less vulnerable to HFT tactics that
can disadvantage investors.
© 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
On May 6, 2010, a dramatic price drop, now known widely as
the “Flash Crash,” shocked major stock indices in the United States.
Within ﬁve minutes nearly 1000 points had been wiped off the
Dow Jones Index – approximately $1 trillion or 9% of its value. Yet,
within the following ﬁfteen minutes, the Index regained the bulk of
those losses. Such an extreme volatility event should be exceptionally rare, if not impossible, and yet it happened. Smaller versions of
the Flash Crash now occur on a regular basis in the capital markets,
typically hitting individual stocks. One study discovered more than
5000 such “mini ﬂash crashes” during a four-month period (Golub
et al., 2012). Coincident with the appearance of extreme market
volatility is the new dominance of so-called high frequency trading
(“HFT”) systems. Firms deploying these computerized order systems are now responsible for more than 60% of the trading volume
in U.S.-listed stocks. HFTs engage in a range of complex trading tactics that take advantage of the new equally complex structure of the
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capital markets. There is some evidence that the mechanisms used
by HFTs contribute to ﬂash crashes. This has led some to charge
that the stock markets are now “rigged” (Lewis, 2014). We trace
the emergence of extreme volatility and concerns about HFTs to an
important regulatory change implemented by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in 2007. We measure the impact
of this change empirically by examining its effect on a key market metric, the bid-ask spread, and ﬁnd that the regulatory shift,
indeed, disadvantages investors.
Until relatively recently, U.S. stock exchanges shared much in
common with other regulated utilities. Exchanges were private
ﬁrms that served an important public function but could have
monopolistic tendencies. Indeed, from its founding in the late 18th
century until approximately 2007, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) enjoyed near-monopoly status, listing a set of stocks and
executing the vast majority of trades for those stocks. The Nasdaq,
once it emerged in the 1970s, also achieved a near monopoly for a
separate set of stocks that it listed.
Now, however, less than one-fourth of the trades of NYSE-listed
stocks take place on the NYSE ﬂoor. The bulk of trading is now
spread across as many as a dozen different trading venues, including so-called “dark pools” which do not share pricing data with
other venues. This complex trading architecture enables HFTs to
jump ahead of other investor orders or to create a false impression
about the level of demand for certain stocks that can lead to trading
proﬁts for the HFT ﬁrms.
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However, stock exchanges differ from typical regulated utilities in two ways that have important implications for regulation
beyond this narrow context. Speciﬁcally, both were memberowned nonproﬁt organizations and both contained self-regulatory
functions. Nonproﬁt ownership raises analytical challenges in characterizing the incentives of an organization (Hansmann, 1980), and
self-regulation complicates the effect of public regulation, which
could either be a complement or a substitute for private ordering (DeMarzo et al., 2005). More broadly, while nonproﬁts might
seem rare targets of regulation, they appear surprisingly often in
such diverse settings as energy markets, health care, education,
professional sports, industry trade groups and more.
How does nonproﬁt ownership affect self-regulation and public regulation? The stock market and a 2007 regulatory change,
Regulation NMS (Reg. NMS), provide an opportunity to show
how nonproﬁt incentives can be analyzed and understood in a
regulatory context. Previous studies have explored the nonproﬁt
organization of stock exchanges1 but focused on their stock-trading
function, such that the NYSE and Nasdaq were assumed to have
identical objectives. However, an important ﬁnding of the nonproﬁt
literature is that nonproﬁts can have heterogeneous objective functions even within the same industry or market (Hansmann, 1980;
Gertler and Kuan, 2009). Existing models also overlook the fact that
exchanges are two-sided markets (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005;
Rochet and Tirole, 2003), serving not just investors but also ﬁrms
that list their shares. Combining these two observations, we posit an
NYSE owned by underwriters who service listing ﬁrms (and therefore service investors who buy shares in those ﬁrms), and a Nasdaq
owned by broker-dealers who proﬁt from investor activity.2
The incentives of two such exchanges differ substantially from
each other. The agency problem between a broker-dealer and
investors in a broker-dealer-owned exchange is modeled in the
literature (DeMarzo et al., 2005). By contrast, an underwriterowned exchange involves vertical integration (Kuan, 2001)., in
which underwriters operate a marketplace to increase the value
of their underwriting services. (Below, we describe in some detail
how orderliness in trading can attract investors, who are the customers of underwriters’ clients). The resulting incentive difference
thus leads to a predictable performance difference between the
two exchanges. A broker-dealer-owned exchange would maximize proﬁts from investors’ trades, while a vertically integrated
exchange would offer trading services at a lower cost, possibly even
below cost in a two-sided market (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). In short,
the Nasdaq would provide higher-cost services than the NYSE.
Reg. NMS allows for a test of this hypothesis. Before 2007, a
“best price rule” required brokers to route trades to the venue with
the best posted price. For NYSE-listed stocks, this was typically the
NYSE, so 80% or more of NYSE-listed stock trades took place on the
NYSE, with the other 20% performed by smaller, regional exchanges

1
Pirrong (2000) and Hart and Moore (1996) examine the reasons for nonproﬁt
organization; and a literature on demutualization explores the role of technology in
exchanges demutualization (Aggarwal, 2002; Steil, 2002; Stoll, 2002).
2
Institutional details are informative. Prior to its 2006 IPO, underwriters dominated the NYSE (Gasparino, 2007; Harris, 2010; NYSE, 2006) and listed only those
ﬁrms that met stringent, formal listing requirements. Long before the federal regulation of disclosures to investors, the NYSE mandated disclosures by their listed
ﬁrms, following the “due diligence” practices developed by underwriting banks
(Loss and Seligman, 2006; Carosso, 1970). By contrast, the Nasdaq – an acronym
for the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system –
is a computer network that knits together a loose confederation of broker-dealers.
The Nasdaq evolved out of the older over-the-counter market, which traded unlisted
securities. Once established as a venue for listing, its culture of trading weaker ﬁrms
continued, with minimal listing standards.

and the Nasdaq.3 Reg. NMS replaced this rule and allowed brokers
to route orders to the Nasdaq despite a better price on the manual trading ﬂoor of the NYSE.4 Only orders placed on automated
exchanges would now be protected against “trade throughs.”
This regulatory change accommodates a difference-indifferences analysis. In the pre-change period, any Nasdaq
trading of NYSE-listed stocks had to be at the NYSE price or better.
Thus, prices were constrained by regulation to be equal, while
post-change prices are de-constrained. We predict higher investor
costs for the de-constrained, post-Reg. NMS Nasdaq trades in
NYSE-listed stocks. Using stock trade data from a sample of over
200 NYSE-listed stocks 30 days before and after Reg. NMS, we
show that spreads, a commonly used measure of investor cost,
increase for trades on the Nasdaq relative to the NYSE.5
The literature offers several alternate hypotheses about the
impact of Reg. NMS. First, regulators predicted that competition
would lead to lower costs for investors (SEC, 2005b). Second,
“cream-skimming” could occur in which an entrant, the Nasdaq,
siphons off high-proﬁt, uninformed, trades leaving lower-proﬁt
trades with the incumbent NYSE. This would raise investor costs at
the NYSE (Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997; Easley et al., 1996;
Battalio et al., 1997).6 Third, auction (dealer) markets might be
better than dealer (auction) markets, in general (Huang and Stoll,
1996; Afﬂeck-Graves et al., 1994; SEC, 2004). Our test does not quite
address this last hypothesis because the design details of any auction or dealer market inﬂuence performance so signiﬁcantly that
we cannot claim to compare these two mechanisms in the abstract.
Rather, we argue that owners make design choices based on their
incentives and our analysis compares two realized sets of design
decisions.
The dramatic changes in stock market structure since our period
of analysis might suggest that this analysis is of historical interest
only. Exchanges have proliferated, technology has made ﬂoor trading seem more archaic than in 2007, and neither the NYSE nor the
Nasdaq is still a nonproﬁt. However, while a complete analysis of
the current industry structure is beyond the scope of this paper, we
would argue that our analysis actually helps explain today’s often
bewildering stock market by reinterpreting the institutional design
and self-regulation of the NYSE as part of a vertically integrated
system where private incentives generated a low-cost, orderly market that attracted investors and listings. More broadly, our study
suggests that the incentives of nonproﬁts should be carefully considered because they may differ from those of for-proﬁts and even
other nonproﬁts in the same market, and that these incentives,

3
The best price rule explains, in large part, why the NYSE so long dominated
trading of NYSE stocks. Nasdaq had a monopoly in trading Nasdaq stocks because
the NYSE did no trading of Nasdaq stocks.
4
Speciﬁcally, the trade-through provisions of Reg. NMS require brokers to route
orders to the automated venue posting the best price. The ﬂoor of the NYSE is not
automated unlike the Nasdaq and the newest entrants, electronic communications
networks (ECNs). The rule change was intended to give investors a choice, allowing
them to choose the faster trade execution enabled by automation even though the
execution price might be worse.
5
An important question is why investors would choose a high-cost venue over
a low-cost venue. While some of the shift in volume was perhaps due to investors
choosing faster execution over better prices, earlier “cream-skimming” studies predict that volume would shift to electronic trading venues that pay brokers to route
uninformed trades to their higher-cost venues, i.e., “payment for order ﬂow.” An
“arms race” among HFTs emerged to proﬁt from this “cream,” contributing additional trading volume to the automated venues (Budish et al., 2015).
6
SEC Rule 19c-3 allowed dealers to pay to shift proﬁtable “uninformed” trades
to non-NYSE venues but only applied to certain NYSE stocks. This restriction makes
a difference in differences comparison possible. Battalio et al. (1997) ﬁnd that after
the proﬁtable, small-sized, uninformed trades moved to alternative venues, spreads
increased for the NYSE stocks that were included in the Rule, but the analysis did not
decompose the trades by venue to identify which trades had caused the increase.
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which are susceptible to analysis, can affect self-regulation and the
effectiveness of public regulation.

2. Background
The NYSE formed over 200 years ago when traders began gathering informally onWall Street. Michie (1987) and Geisst (1997) detail
the long historical process of institutional change at the Exchange,
which included moving trading activity indoors, formal incorporation, competition with a variety of formal and informal exchanges,
and the adoption and adaptation of mechanisms, rules, and procedures, including restrictive membership and listing requirements.
Thus, trading on the Exchange was limited to the carefully vetted
owners of 1366 “seats,” a number that was set in the mid-20th century and remained the same until the Exchange’s demutualization
in 2006. Its listing standards meant that only a limited subset of
publicly traded ﬁrms could sell their shares on the Exchange.
Emerging from a longstanding but informal over the counter
(“OTC”) trading market, the Nasdaq began formal operation in 1971
with the expectation that it could compete with the NYSE if the barriers between OTC and exchange-listed securities were removed.
The Nasdaq comprises broker-dealers connected initially by telephone and later by a computer network. It was immediately more
inclusive than the clubby NYSE. Thus, even unproﬁtable ﬁrms could
trade on this market, and dealers needed only be members of the
NASD to participate in that trading. By the mid-1990s the NASD
had 5400 ﬁrms with more than 57,000 branch ofﬁces and “nearly
500,000 registered securities professionals” (NASD Report cited in
Loss and Seligman, 2006 at 703). With more than 5500 listed companies, Nasdaq dealers in the mid-1990s traded in the stocks of
more than twice as many ﬁrms as the NYSE. The Nasdaq’s listing
standards were far laxer than those at the NYSE, which reﬂected the
entity’s origins in the weakly regulated OTC market. One study, for
example, found the Nasdaq’s standards to be “partially responsible
for the inﬂux of poorly-performing IPOs during the Nasdaq market
bubble of the late 1990s” (Klein and Mohanram, 2005).
While the original goal of the Nasdaq to engage as a direct
competitor in trading of NYSE listed securities was long delayed,
the Nasdaq served as a useful complement to the NYSE. The two
exchanges differed in several ways, in addition to the signiﬁcantly
larger number of listings on the Nasdaq. Quality seemed to be
lower at the Nasdaq, where the total market capitalization was
less than that of the NYSE despite the much greater number of
listed ﬁrms. Different trading mechanisms were chosen by each
exchange. Using the computer network that is the foundation of
the Nasdaq, dealers take part in both sides of every trade, buying from sellers and selling to buyers. The NYSE employs a manual
ﬂoor trading process that appears to be the outdated holdover of a
centuries-old institution. However, our proposition that trading is
a complement to underwriting calls for a closer examination of this
key institutional feature.
For each listed ﬁrm, the NYSE assigns a specialist who conducts all of the trades of a ﬁrm’s shares at a single trading post.
The specialist (called a “designated market maker” in the post-Reg.
NMS environment) is subject to rules that ensure an orderly price
discovery process. Under the NYSE’s continuous “double auction”
mechanism, the specialist repeatedly gathers all buy and sell orders
and sets a quote for bids and asks. This quote, by rule, must be close
to the previous bids and asks (NYSE, Rule 104). Buyers are then
matched to sellers by the specialist acting as a broker (or agent).
Any unmatched residual is bought (sold) by the specialist acting as
a dealer (or principal), if necessary, to maintain a “fair and orderly”
market (Exchange Act Sec. 11(b) and Rule 11b-1; NYSE Rule 104).
Note that the NYSE’sauction mechanismdiffers from the Nasdaq’s
pure dealer mechanism, in which the dealer is the counter-party on
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both sides of every transaction. The Nasdaq dealer buys from third
party sellers, resells to third party buyers, and thus proﬁts from a
wider spread while not being required to enter the market to ensure
orderliness.
While the privileged information that a specialist enjoys is
potentially valuable, rules and enforcement minimize its exploitation (Mann and Seijas, 1991; Dutta and Madhavan, 1995; Battalio
et al., 2007; Madhavan and Panchapagesan, 2000, 655; but see
SEC 2005a). If trading is viewed as a complement to underwriting,
specialists are best understood as having been, prior to the implementation of Reg. NMS, agents of the underwriter-owners of the
NYSE, and rule enforcement can be modeled as the outcome of a
principal-agent relationship. This is notably different from the selfregulation by Nasdaq of its members, who are peers (SEC, 1996).
An empirical literature has tried to measure the effects of different exchange features. Bid-ask spreads, for example, a measure
of investor cost and disorderliness, are higher for Nasdaq stocks,
but this could be the result of the underlying riskiness of the
stocks or of the Nasdaq’s dealer mechanism. Because each exchange
monopolized trading of (an almost) disjoint sets of stocks, direct
comparisons of trading mechanisms have been impossible.7 Reg.
NMS allows for a better test, as NYSE stocks now trade freely at
different prices on both exchanges.
In replacing the old “best price” rule with what is now known
as the “trade through” rule, Reg. NMS initiated substantial structural changes to the stock market. But even before Reg. NMS was
implemented, change had already begun. The ﬁnal regulation was
adopted in August 2005; six months later, the NYSE demutualized via a merger with the publicly-traded Archipelago, an ECN
(Diamond and Kuan, 2006). NYSE members thereby agreed to
convert their nonproﬁt into a publicly traded, investor-owned forproﬁt corporation. While Reg. NMS and demutualization might
seem to be two unrelated events, our model of vertical integration
suggests otherwise. If underwriters who were vertically integrated
with trading could no longer produce orderliness, they would sell
their trading operation. And loss of control over orderliness was
predictable; the NYSE’s share of trading volume in NYSE listed
stocks began a steep decline to 25% (see Fig. 1) so that prices of
those stocks were no longer set solely by the NYSE.
Final implementation of Reg. NMS took an additional year and
a half after NYSE demutualization so that the NYSE and Nasdaq
were both for-proﬁt ﬁrms at the time of our empirical study.8 We
nevertheless interpret our results as reﬂecting the incentives of
two different ownership interests, each of which instituted longlasting mechanisms and structures that take time to dismantle. So,
while a merger might reduce the NYSE’s self-regulatory activity,
the dealer and auction mechanisms, which are of particular relevance for our study, remained. Moreover, if the NYSE’s low-cost
mechanism degraded toward a higher-cost mechanism, it would
only work against our hypothesis and weaken our results.
3. Hypotheses
The interpretation of the bid-ask spread as an investor cost is
well established in the literature, but is particularly appropriate in

7
Empirical strategies for comparing mechanisms include using matched pairs of
stocks from the NYSE and Nasdaq. This is challenging because NYSE-listed ﬁrms have
much bigger market capitalizations, which is a match dimension (Huang and Stoll,
1996; Afﬂeck-Graves et al., 1994). An alternative approach uses the relatively few
ﬁrms that move their listings from the Nasdaq to the NYSE as the basis of comparison
(Christie and Huang, 1994; Barclay et al., 1998; SEC, 2004). The studies ﬁnd lower
bid-ask spreads at the NYSE but are problematic because of selection issues, as those
stocks might be less risky, for example.
8
The NASD began the process of divesting and demutualizing the Nasdaq in 2000,
well before Reg. NMS, and ﬁnally completed that process at the end of 2006.
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Fig. 1. Trading Volume for all NYSE-listed stocks (Jan 2004–Dec 2011).

our case because heterogeneous ownership generates a hypothesis about differential spreads. Dealers proﬁt directly from spreads,
buying low and selling high from their customers, while underwriters have the opposite incentive, to reduce spreads to attract
investors for their underwriting clients. Thus, we hypothesize that
before Reg. NMS, spreads for NYSE-listed stocks are the same on
both exchanges by rule, but increase for trades on the Nasdaq after
Reg. NMS. Competing hypotheses are presented in the literature,
as mentioned above.
We estimate a ﬁxed effects difference-in-differences model
using panel data:
sijt = a + b1 nasdaqijt + b2 afterijt + b3 trendijt + b4 nasdaqijt ∗afterijt
+ b5 trendijt ∗afterijt + eit

(1)

where the dependent variable, sijt , is the bid-ask spread for stock
i on exchange j at time t. Nasdaq is 1 for Nasdaq spreads and the
omitted category is NYSE. After is 1 if time t is after Reg. NMS implementation. The explanatory variable is the interaction between
nasdaq and after. We hypothesize that this interaction will be positive, as spreads on Nasdaq trades increase relative to NYSE trades.
As a robustness check, we include a time-trend variable, trend,
the time period in days. The interaction term trend*after, interacts
the time-trend with “after Reg. NMS” to detect whether our results
are driven by a general time trend or only begin after the regulation.
4. Data
We follow the literature on several dimensions of our empirical
strategy. In addition to measuring daily bid-ask spreads (Corwin
and Schultz, 2012) in a differences-in-differences design, we also
use a broad cross section of stocks, decompose the spread by venue
(Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997), and use a 30-day event window. Also, we use transaction data from the Wharton Research Data
Services (WRDS) Trade and Quote (TAQ) dataset, which provides
the timing and size of each trade, the price for each transaction,
and the exchange where the trade took place.
4.1. Sample
We restrict our attention to NYSE-listed stocks because Reg.
NMS affects the NYSE’s monopoly position in trading, not the Nasdaq’s. Recall that the Nasdaq’s monopoly in trading is the result of
the NYSE’s organizational design, which provides no mechanism for
trading Nasdaq-listed stocks. We selected a sample of 222 stocks

from a variety of industries in the top quartile of trading volume
and market capitalization. Together, they account for about 15% of
the industrial ﬁrms listed on the NYSE.
We selected actively traded stocks because of the endogeneity
of trading volume and spreads: on the one hand, liquidity is associated with smaller spreads; on the other hand, lower spreads might
encourage people to trade, thus increasing liquidity. So, if Reg. NMS
caused spreads to decrease, as some of the alternate hypotheses
predict, we might worry that the measured decline in spreads was
conﬂating the effect of Reg. NMS with increased liquidity as lower
spreads attracted more investors. By restricting our attention to
stocks that always trade heavily, we minimize the effect of liquidity changes on spread, and thus also do not control for volume in
the regressions. Selecting only heavily traded stocks addresses a
second liquidity problem, as well. If the share of trading shifted
signiﬁcantly away from the NYSE to the Nasdaq, the decrease in
liquidity causes an identiﬁcation problem. However, because “liquidity can obtain in fragmented trading, at least for the most active
securities” (O’Hara, 2004, 43), we use only heavily traded stocks to
avoid falling below a liquidity threshold.
4.2. Spread decomposition
For each stock in our sample, we calculate the spread twice for
each day: once using Nasdaq transactions and once using NYSE
transactions. Recall that although we have described the NYSE as
having a near-monopoly, 20% of trades of NYSE-listed stocks had
traded on the Nasdaq long before Reg. NMS. So, for each stock
on each day, we can separate Nasdaq transactions from NYSE
transactions and calculate a separate spread for each exchange’s
transactions. In this way, we can compare the spread generated by
trading activity on the Nasdaq with the spread generated by trading activity on the NYSE for the same stock on the same day. We
follow Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) in decomposing spreads
in this manner.
4.3. Event window
Our time window for analysis is the 30 trading days before
and after the implementation of Reg. NMS, which began on July
9, 2007. While 30 days is a relatively short time in which to see
large changes in market outcomes, the time window is intentionally small in order to isolate the effects of regulatory change from
other changes in the market. Again, to select the size of our event
window, we follow existing studies including Easley et al. (1996),
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Fig. 2. Average difference in trading volume for sample (mill shares): NYSE transactions – Nasdaq transactions.

Fig. 3. Spread differential over event date.

Battalio et al. (1998), Foucault and Menkveld (2008), and Chung and
Chuwonganant (2012) who also study Reg. NMS and ﬁnd a decline
in other indicators of market quality after its implementation. The
SEC also applied a similar 60-day event window to its pilot study
for Reg. NMS.9
Figs. 2 and 3 plot descriptive statistics for our sample over the
event window. Fig. 2 shows no appreciable shift in average trading
volume for our sample stocks over the event window—certainly
nothing as great as the eventual shift in trading volume seen in
Fig. 1. Fig. 3 shows our metric of interest, the average spread differentials for NYSE and Nasdaq transactions for our sample (i.e.,
Nasdaq spread – NYSE spread). A slightly higher level after Reg.
NMS may be discernable, as is a positive differential even before
Reg. NMS.
5. Results
Table 1 presents results from variations of the model in Eq. (1),
where spread is measured in cents (i.e., calculated spread is multi-

9
The SEC ordered a pilot test of Reg. NMS and asked the NYSE to select 100
listings for a 30-day test, which began July 9, 2007. We constructed our distinct
sample by selecting all large-cap, heavily traded stocks in the same industries as the
pilots. Because there were no technological barriers to implementing the new Order
Protection Rule on July 9 for all listings, we tested whether trades for pilot stocks
were routed differently than other NYSE stocks and found that they were not. We
therefore take July 9 to be the start date for Reg. NMS generally for all NYSE listings.

plied by 100). Model 1 is the basic speciﬁcation in Eq. (1). We ﬁnd
that the interaction term is positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that
Nasdaq spreads for NYSE-listed shares increase relative to NYSE
spreads after Reg. NMS.
We also ﬁnd that Nasdaq spreads are higher overall than NYSE
spreads. One explanation for this is that Nasdaq trades met the
posted NYSE quote, while NYSE transactions occurred inside the
quote, i.e., at a better price. This would be consistent with Petersen

Table 1
Change in bid-ask spread of trades before and after the implementation of Reg. NMS
(July 9, 2007).

Nasdaq (y = 1)
After
Nasdaq* after
Trend
Trend* after
R2 (within)
R2 (between)
R2 (overall)
N

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.024*** (0.004)
0.163*** (0.015)
0.033*** (0.007)

0.024*** (0.004)
−0.054** (0.022)
0.033*** (0.007)
0.007*** (0.001)

0.013
0.053
0.013
27,166

0.020
0.044
0.019
27,166

0.024*** (0.004)
−0.550*** (0.059)
0.033*** (0.007)
0.001 (0.001)
0.014*** (0.001)
0.026
0.053
0.026
27,166

Notes. Values are estimated coefﬁcients, with standard errors in parentheses. The
dependent variable is the bid-ask spread.
*
Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 10% level.
**
Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level.
***
Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1% level.
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Fig. 4. Average Bid-Ask Spread ($) for NYSE-listed stocks, Jan 1995–Dec 2009.

and Fialkowski’s (1994) ﬁndings that actual spreads are half the
size of posted spreads for trades on the NYSE.
Model 1 also shows a secular increase in spreads after Reg. NMS.
Models 2 and 3 present our robustness check, by adding a control
for a time trend. The results show a positive and signiﬁcant effect of
time. However, Model 3, which interacts the time trend with after
NMS, shows that the time trend begins after Reg. NMS, with no
trend before Reg. NMS. This suggests that the effects of regulation
might occur gradually.
The average spread in our sample is 0.53 cents for NYSE trades
and 0.57 cents for Nasdaq trades. The coefﬁcients, also reported
in cents, suggest that spreads increase by 0.033 cents, or 6%, for
Nasdaq trades relative to NYSE trades in the ﬁrst month of the new
regulation. This is in addition to higher spreads for Nasdaq trades
generally of about 0.024 cents, or 4.5%. Thus, the ﬁrst month of
Reg. NMS saw a difference in spreads between NYSE and Nasdaq
trades of 10%. The longer-term descriptive data in Fig. 4 suggest
that spreads increase substantially more over time.
Note that our results allow us to reject alternate hypotheses.
The competitive outcome of lower spreads does not obtain, nor
does the no-change outcome. Rather, market outcomes are driven
by heterogeneous incentives.

6. Discussion & conclusion
Nonproﬁts are not always strange animals. In fact, sometimes
they do exactly what a for-proﬁt would do, as was the case with
the nonproﬁt and for-proﬁt versions of the Nasdaq. But nonproﬁts
can behave differently than for-proﬁts for predictable reasons and
in predictable ways.
In this study, we provide an example of a nonproﬁt member
organization vertically integrating into stock trading to enhance
underwriting proﬁts. While underwriting activity gets less attention than trading, it is a lucrative business in which a single initial
public offering (IPO) can easily generate tens of millions – and even
hundreds of millions – of dollars in fees for the lead underwriters
(Ho and Demos, 2014). To maximize that business, underwriters,
which we posit have long dominated the NYSE, ensured that trading was orderly, i.e., continuous and relatively smooth, by tightly
regulating specialists. This helped prevent the development of
a “lemons” problem at the NYSE (Akerlof, 1970), which in turn
enabled underwriters to generate higher and more accurate IPO
valuations and, therefore, higher underwriting proﬁts. Our institu-

tional analysis highlights the incentives behind mechanisms and
outcomes that are often taken for granted, with recent problems
serving as counterfactuals. Events such as the “ﬂash crash” of 2010
and the allegations of market “rigging” in favor of so-called “high
frequency traders” (Lewis, 2014), can undermine investor conﬁdence in the market. In addition, botched IPOs, such as that of
Facebook on the Nasdaq and BATS on its own internal trading system, demonstrate that the underwriting process is difﬁcult and
complex.
The stock market is an economically important institution, but
it is just one of many regulated industries. Nonproﬁts are frequently involved in providing public goods, often as monopolies.
This study demonstrates the importance of carefully analyzing nonproﬁt incentives, including their potential heterogeneity.
(*foreign-owned; **exchange traded fund; ***out of business)
ABI APPLERA CORP
ABT ABBOTT LABORATORIES
ABY ABITIBI CONSOLIDATED INC**
ACI ARCH COAL INC
AEO AMERICAN EAGLE OUTFITTERS INC NE
AET AETNA INC NEW
AG AGCO CORP
AHM AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE INVT CORP ***
AIG AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC
ANF ABERCROMBIE & FITCH CO
AT ALLTEL CORP
BR BROADRIDGE FINANCIAL SOLUTNS INC
BTU PEABODY ENERGY CORP
C CITIGROUP INC
CAG CONAGRA INC
CAH CARDINAL HEALTH INC
CAL CONTINENTAL AIRLINES INC
CCJ CAMECO CORP **
CCU CLEAR CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS INC
CNP CENTERPOINT ENERGY INC
CNQ CANADIAN NATURAL RESOURCES LTD *
CPB CAMPBELL SOUP CO
D DOMINION RESOURCES INC VA NEW
DNA GENENTECH INC
DOW DOW CHEMICAL CO
DOX AMDOCS LTD **
DRL DORAL FINANCIAL CORP
ED CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC
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EEM ISHARES TRUST **
EIX EDISON INTERNATIONAL
EP EL PASO CORP
EWT ISHARES INC
FCS FAIRCHILD SEMICONDUCTOR INTL INC
FMT FREMONT GENERAL CORP
FRX FOREST LABS INC
GCI GANNETT INC
GD GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP
GE GENERAL ELECTRIC CO
GS GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC
GSF GLOBALSANTAFE CORP *
HC HANOVER COMPRESSOR CO
HES HESS CORP
HIG HARTFORD FINANCIAL SVCS GRP INC
HK PETROHAWK ENERGY CORP
HON HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC
HRB BLOCK H & R INC
IBN ICICI BANK LTD *
IGT INTERNATIONAL GAME TECHNOLOGY
IMH IMPAC MORTGAGE HOLDINGS INC **
IP INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO
JNJ JOHNSON & JOHNSON
JPM JPMORGAN CHASE & CO
KG KING PHARMACEUTICALS INC
KSS KOHLS CORP
LM LEGG MASON INC
LOW LOWES COMPANIES INC
LTR LOEWS CORP
MAS MASCO CORP
MDT MEDTRONIC INC
MO ALTRIA GROUP INC
MRK MERCK & CO INC
MRO MARATHON OIL CORP
MS MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER & CO
MTG M G I C INVESTMENT CORP WIS
NEM NEWMONT MINING CORP
NFX NEWFIELD EXPLORATION CO
NLY ANNALY CAPITAL MANAGEMENT INC **
NRG N R G ENERGY INC
NSM NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR CORP
NWS NEWS CORP
NYT NEW YORK TIMES CO
PDP POWERSHARES ETF TRUST**
PG PROCTER & GAMBLE CO
PGR PROGRESSIVE CORP OH
PHM PULTE HOMES INC
PRU PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC
Q QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTL INC
RDC ROWAN COMPANIES INC
RDN RADIAN GROUP INC
RRI RELIANT ENERGY INC
RYL RYLAND GROUP INC
SAP SAP AG*
SKM S K TELECOM CO LTD *
SKS SAKS INC
SLR SOLECTRON CORP
STZ CONSTELLATION BRANDS INC
SVM SERVICEMASTER CO
T AT &T INC
TIE TITANIUM METALS CORP
TIN TEMPLE INLAND INC
TOL TOLL BROTHERS INC
TRI TRIAD HOSPITALS INC
TV GRUPO TELEVISA SA*
VG VONAGE HOLDINGS CORP
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VIA VIACOM INC NEW
WCI W C I COMMUNITIES INC
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